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On paper, the powers and responsibilities of Russia's Security Council (SC) are vast, 
but in practice Boris Yel'tsin jealously guarded his authority over the security services. 
During his tenure, the various "organs" were within the president's sole purview, the 
sphere upon which no one else should encroach. Thus, the security ministries were not 
subordinate to the government, nor were they subject to judicial or legislative oversight.
Institutionally, the SC secretary could amass substantial unchecked power. Yel'tsin, 
however, never let this happen. He used the Security Council as political necessity 
dictated, but never allowed it to become a genuinely autonomous institution. Vladimir 
Putin seems to have adopted a different approach. He has placed close allies, first 
Sergei Ivanov, then Vladimir B. Rushailo, in the secretary position, and has sought to 
broaden the structure of the SC. It remains to be seen if Putin feels secure enough to 
allow the SC to develop as a substantive institution and pursue meaningful progress on 
the national security agenda.
The Ten Secretaries
In July 1991, Yel'tsin issued a decree establishing a commission that would recommend 
the structure and duties of a Security Council (Sovet Bezopasnosti), to be chaired by 
Deputy Prime Minister Yuri B. Skokov. The following April, this man was appointed as 
the first secretary of the new council, which received the task of formulating domestic, 
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foreign, and defense policies, i.e., preparing presidential decisions of a national security 
nature.(2)
Depending on his relationship with the president, the Security Council secretary may 
become the second most important personage in Russia or just another functionary 
without access to the top of the pyramid.(3) Yel'tsin would use the Security Council to 
fulfill a particularly important task (e.g., start and end the Chechen war) but then shuffle 
the cadres before the council could become a challenger to his authority.
The original council had a staff limited to 80 individuals, among whom about 20 came 
from the military. Most of the others were drawn from the former CPSU Central 
Committee apparatus or the military-industrial complex, in both of which Skokov had 
previously worked as a trusted Communist Party apparatchik (rising to deputy prime 
minister of the Russian republic). During July 1992, another Yel'tsin decree assigned to 
the Security Council secretary the task of coordinating the work of executive organs as 
well as implementing presidential national security directives.(4) The increased 
responsibility, however, would not translate into increased status for Skokov. Having 
opposed Yel'tsin's plans to introduce presidential rule during an October 1992 SC 
discussion, Skokov was passed over for prime minister two months later. He was fired 
the following May, after refusing to countersign a presidential decree introducing a state 
of emergency and dissolving parliament. Skokov's attempt to usurp external policy-
making from the foreign affairs ministry with his own foreign policy concept also failed. 
Yel'tsin apparently never intended for the Security Council, and especially its secretary, 
to become powerful in their own right. Yel'tsin made sure that this situation, where the 
SC secretary attempts to thwart presidential authority over "the organs," would never 
recur.
Skokov was succeeded by the commanding officer for the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) armed forces, Air Marshal Yevgeni I. Shaposhnikov, who had 
served as Soviet defense minister after the failed August 1991 coup attempt. Two 
weeks after Yel'tsin had appointed Marshal Shaposhnikov as SC secretary, he 
2
personally selected Lt. General Valeri L. Manilov as deputy secretary. This man had 
always served as a deputy commanding officer for political affairs (politruk) in the armed 
forces, i.e., as watchdog over the political reliability of combat officers. Obviously, 
Shaposhnikov did not have the full confidence of Yel'tsin. Although he did expand the 
staff to 150 individuals,(5) Shaposhnikov's appointment never was approved by the 
Supreme Soviet, and his tenure lasted less than two months. The appointment of a 
career armed forces officer would have suggested that the SC might be concentrating 
on military affairs rather than national security in the broader meaning of that term. 
Marshal Shaposhnikov had envisaged the SC as the center for coordination of all 
national security policies. To implement this concept effectively, cooperation of the 
defense minister, Army Gen. Pavel S. Grachev, as well as the interior minister, Col. Gen. 
Viktor F. Yerin, would have been necessary. This he did not achieve. The Supreme 
Soviet's refusal to confirm his appointment forced Shaposhnikov to resign.
Under its first two secretaries, the SC had functioned on the basis of collegiality. This 
condition ended with the appointment of then First Deputy Premier Oleg I. Lobov as 
secretary. He immediately began to recruit mid-level officials from the State Economic 
Planning Commission (Gosplan), where he had worked, and, thus, concentrated on the 
economy, with total staff increasing to around 300. In contrast to his predecessors, 
Lobov had strong support from the military-industrial complex, hence, his emphasis on 
economic security. Meanwhile, dissolution of the parliament by force in October 1993 
reaffirmed Yel'tsin's dominance over the Security Council, which became even more 
pronounced. Yel'tsin strengthened the SC's power by listing it in the constitution as an 
official government organ. That document only states that the president "forms and 
leads the Security Council of the Russian Federation." But almost immediately, Yel'tsin 
created a counterweight. On 6 January 1994, Yel'tsin appointed an assistant for national 
security affairs in the person of Yuri M. Baturin, who was given oversight for the power 
"organs" (defense, interior, security, intelligence). Two months later, Baturin also 
became chairman of the commission on senior military and general officer ranks.
3
On 25 November 1994, the Security Council gave Yel'tsin its unanimous support for the 
invasion of Chechnya. Less than two weeks later, some 55,000 Russian troops 
marched into that mini-state to disarm an estimated 3,000 armed Chechens. Yel'tsin 
insisted that the above vote take place before any discussion. It's clear from a variety of 
sources that Yel'tsin reached the decision before the meeting was held. However, 
through the formality of the SC, its members shared the responsibility for the president's 
decision.(6) Those who subsequently voiced reservations included Justice Minister Yuri 
K. Kalmykov, foreign intelligence chief Yevgeni M. Primakov, and Foreign Minister 
Andrei V. Kozyrev.(7)
Lobov's attempts to strengthen his own influence were affected adversely by the war in 
Chechnya. His last mistake involved personal support for the "party of war" during the 
1996 presidential election campaign. Hence Lobov reverted to deputy premier. He was 
succeeded as SC secretary by Lieutenant General Aleksandr I. Lebed'. The former 
paratrooper, a popular and flamboyant figure, had come in third during the first round of 
the presidential election. An endorsement by Lebed' was needed to bolster Yel'tsin's 
chances against communist candidate Gennady Zyuganov in the run-off race. This 
support was rewarded with the SC secretary position.(8) In his new office, Lebed' 
carried out Yel'tsin's campaign promise: to end the war in Chechnya. Thereby Lebed' 
accepted the responsibility for the cease-fire signed at Khasavyurt, Dagestan, in August 
1996 just as the SC had accepted the responsibility for the invasion.
To counter Lebed's growing popularity, President Yel'tsin established a Defense Council 
under Baturin. It functioned as a new control mechanism formalizing Baturin's authority 
over the power ministries. These moves undercut SC power. In October 1996, after only 
133 days on the job, Lebed' was dismissed for insubordination to Yel'tsin, who did not 
want him as his successor.(9) When he learned that Yel'tsin would have heart surgery, 
Lebed' urged the president to transfer his executive powers to him before the operation. 
The general was fired by the president on national television.
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The next SC secretary, Ivan P. Rybkin, had been the first speaker of the State Duma. 
His appointment sent a signal that the Security Council's purview would be 
demilitarized. Rybkin had served as an adviser to financial tycoon Boris A. Berezovsky. 
As the Chechnya problem continued to fester, the latter became SC deputy secretary. 
This allowed Berezovsky to secure his financial interests, e.g., transit of oil from the 
Caspian Sea across Chechnya. In this period, Baturin managed military reform while 
the Security Council began to emphasize domestic security over international affairs 
and commenced work on a new security policy concept. Then Rybkin signaled that the 
SC would undergo a demilitarization and perhaps become more open in its activities.
In March 1998, Rybkin(10) in turn was succeeded by Andrei A. Kokoshin as a move 
possibly to weaken Berezovsky's influence within the circle of advisers around Yel'tsin. 
At this point, the SC absorbed the Defense Council, where Kokoshin had replaced 
Baturin. The first deputy defense minister in 1992, Kokoshin became the sole defense 
intellectual to serve as SC secretary. Prior to that, he had been the principal military 
inspector and secretary of the Defense Council. Kokoshin brought his former staff with 
him, which capped the SC to some 200 persons. However, the SC no longer dealt with 
Chechnya and was charged with reforming the armed forces.
Kokoshin's successor, Col. General Bordyuzha, former director of the Federal Border 
Service, received a concurrent appointment as head of the presidential administration in 
the Kremlin. Yel'tsin began attending SC meetings less frequently and, hence, the 
prestige of this organization declined. Bordyuzha cut the number of SC staffers back to 
175 individuals. Bordyuzha, seen as an ally of Primakov, was removed at roughly the 
same time as Primakov's other important ally, Prosecutor General Yuri I. Skuratov. 
Conflicts with Yel'tsin's older daughter, Tatyana Dyachenko (in charge of public relations 
for the Kremlin), led to both men's dismissals during the spring of 1999. In this period 
the influence of the SC had continued to decline.
Since his appointment as FSB director in the summer of 1998, Vladimir V. Putin had the 
ear of the "tsar."(11) After Putin was made SC secretary in March 1999, the body's 
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prestige increased dramatically. Under the new secretary, the SC commenced intensive 
work on various national security concepts and doctrines. Putin is reputed to have told 
his former colleagues that the FSB (former KGB) now had a foothold in the Kremlin. 
After he had been named prime minister on 9 August 1999, he held both positions for 
three months, allowing him to amass more power over the security services than any 
previous prime minister.
The subsequent SC secretary, Sergei B. Ivanov,(12) had served as Putin's deputy in the 
FSB. Ivanov completed work on several doctrines and concepts begun under his 
predecessor. In November 2000, his rank as lieutenant general in the foreign 
intelligence service was revoked, anticipating that he would become the first "civilian" 
defense minister on 28 March 2001. Both Putin and Ivanov studied at Leningrad State 
University, entered the KGB, and served abroad; the former in East Germany and the 
latter in Sweden. From this point on, foreign policy was being formulated by the Security 
Council and then implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Oversight for military 
reform was again transferred to SC purview, obviously with more authority than 
Kokoshin ever had.
The days of the special services did not end, however. The current SC secretary is 
Vladimir B. Rushailo, a colonel general and career police officer, who had served as 
minister for internal affairs. It is possible that the SC will decline in importance under this 
man, another close associate of Putin who was instrumental in the presidential 
campaign. His entire career had been concentrated on the struggle against domestic 
crime. Such a background does not suggest a dynamic personality who would be 
capable of making recommendations on high-level national security policies to the 
president of Russia.(13)
Rushailo's appointment was completely unexpected. Given his background, emphasis is 
likely to be focused on the struggle against domestic crime and terrorism. Hence, 
international affairs will be concentrated in the hands of Putin, with advice from Defense 
Minister Ivanov rather than the foreign minister or the SC, which again has been 
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saddled with responsibility for the war in Chechnya. It is worth noting that a majority of 
the SC secretaries has come from the armed forces, the KGB/FSB, and uniformed 
police-especially the most recent four individuals.
Under Putin, the SC underwent an important alteration. The seven super-administrative 
districts were established by decree on 13 May 2000. All seven presidential 
representatives are ex officio members of the Security Council. This also portends a 
decline in the influence of the Security Council from the most important policy-making 
body in the diplomatic and national defense areas to a resurrected political bureau of 
the former ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Mikhail S. Gorbachëv's last 
politburo(14) included eight regular members plus fifteen ex-officio CPSU leaders from 
the constituent republics. Only the former voted. The parallel is striking!
Modus Operandi
Formally established by presidential decree no. 547 on 3 June 1992, the Security 
Council's principal tasks were enumerated at that time. Preparation of presidential 
decisions takes place through the six inter-agency commissions. These are organized 
along functional lines. Initially, there had been 10 such commissions.
The secretary bears personal responsibility for all SC activities. He interacts with other 
governmental ministers and agencies, and his oral reports to the Russian president take 
place on a weekly basis. This routine allows him to influence all decisions of a national 
security nature, if he has the intellectual capacity to do so.
The following basic tasks, assigned to the SC, appear in federal legislation "On 
Security": (15)
! assessing internal and external threats and their sources
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! preparing scientifically based prognoses about changes in domestic and foreign 
! security considerations
! developing and coordinating federal programs to safeguard Russian Federation 
! (RF) security
! analyzing and processing information concerning preservation of RF security
! informing the SC about implementing its decisions
! organizing scientific research on RF security
! preparing SC decisions and proposals for presidential decrees about security
! preparing analytical information materials for the president 
The third consecutive secretary published an article about the above activities. 
According to Oleg Lobov, the SC had become the lead consultative-coordinating organ 
in the field of national security. Its main tasks included
! implementation of presidential functions in domestic, foreign, and military security 
! policies;
! preservation of Russia's sovereignty;
! support for sociopolitical stability in society; and
! defense of citizens' rights and freedoms(16)
Recommendations are voted on and passed by simple majority among the five 
permanent SC members and the chairman (who certainly has veto power), the nineteen 
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regular members having only a consultative voice but no vote. Meetings of the council, 
which at times may be of an extraordinary nature, take place at least once a month. 
They are chaired by President Putin. He has the decisive vote, as suggested above.
The basic working organs are the six inter-agency commissions. (See chart.) These 
may be of a temporary nature, established for a limited period of time. Chaired by senior 
professional staff members of the SC apparatus, they represent the working level of this 
organization.
The SC secretary is also a permanent member of the council, with responsibility for 
planning the work schedule and for preparation of projects and documentation required 
by other SC members on current and anticipated future issues. He is the basic 
coordinator as well as link between the SC and executive/legislative branches of the 
government.
During his weekly sessions with the president, the SC secretary reports on the most 
important problems that require personal intervention by the chief of state. The intention 
here is to alert the president in advance regarding the development of crisis situations 
as well as key problems in the national security field. The SC may also be at the 
receiving end of this process, e.g., when Boris Yel'tsin asked it to prepare a concept for 
the 1996 national budget.
It is apparent from the foregoing that the use to which the Security Council has been 
applied has varied, depending upon the incumbent secretary. The last three of these 
men had served in the KGB/FSB or the uniformed police. All of them shared the same 
Weltanschauung, namely an outlook that had been shaped throughout their earlier 
careers.
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The National Security Concept
A general document with this title was intended to include economic, ecological, social, 
defense information, and other security assessments. Central would be the place and 
role of Russia in the contemporary world, including its national interests, parameters for 
guaranteeing security, and freedom to develop both society as well as individuals. 
Never before had such a task been undertaken.
Toward the end of December 1997, President Yel'tsin signed decree no. 1300, titled 
"National Security Concept of the Russian People,"(17) having been produced by a 
team under the fifth consecutive SC secretary, Ivan P. Rybkin.
Work on a new national security concept probably began when Putin served in the 
above capacity and was completed by his successor, Lt. General (in the foreign 
intelligence service) Sergei B. Ivanov. Approved by presidential decree on 10 January 
2000,(18) it repeats the same two main global trends: (1) a unipolar world, supported by  
the United States; and (2) a multipolar world, espoused by Russia. The first is based 
allegedly on unilateral solutions and the use of military force, regardless of international 
law.
Specific threats to Russia are perceived as originating because of its weakened 
scientific research and development (R & D) capability, increased dependence on 
foreign technology, and deteriorating defense posture. Information warfare is being 
waged to expel Russia from its own internal and external information markets. NATO's 
use of force, outside of its area of responsibility and without UN permission, could lead 
to global destabilization. Foreign special services are increasing their activities against 
Russia. Reforms of the military and defense industry are being delayed, with equipment 
stocks at impermissibly low levels. Social problems also lead to a weakening of military 
security.
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Threats to Russia's national security are listed as follows: (1) a weakened R & D; (2) 
scientific brain drain; (3) separatism; (4) international terrorism; (5) NATO expansion; (6) 
foreign special services; and (7) delays in reforming the armed forces and defense 
industry.
Tasks envisaged by the currently applicable national security concept include identifying 
the above threats and removing them, ensuring security of borders, improving the 
economy, overcoming science and technology dependence on foreign sources, 
strengthening the system of state power, et al. 
The New Military Doctrine
The next major document produced by the Security Council was approved by 
presidential decree on 21 April 2000.(19) It begins with an assessment of the politico-
military situation facing Russia, as follows:
! decline in the threat of a large-scale, including nuclear, war;
! strengthening of regional power centers, ethnic and regional extremism, and 
! separatism;
! spread of local wars and armed conflict; and
! proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
Next, the main threats to Russian military security were identified as follows:
! territorial claims;
! ignoring Russian interests;
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! armed conflict close to CIS borders;
! expansion of foreign blocs and alliances;
! stationing of troops close to CIS borders;
! armed provocation versus Russian military located on foreign soil;
! hostile information operations;
! discrimination against Russian citizens in foreign countries; and
! international terrorism. 
To safeguard military security, the new doctrine proclaims that Russia will strengthen the 
CIS alliance; give preference to nonmilitary means when facing military threats; observe 
arms control treaties (the RF is ready for further reductions of nuclear weapons 
bilaterally with the United States); and promote expansion of confidence-building 
measures.
"The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against any signatory to the 
Nonproliferation Treaty that does not possess such arms, except for an attack by such a 
state against the Russian Federation."
The new military doctrine has classified military operations into four basic categories:
! large-scale (regional) war to protect Russia and its allies;
! local wars to neutralize the aggressor;
! internal armed conflicts to liquidate illegal armed formations; and
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! peacekeeping [Russian word is miro-tvorchestvo, or "peace-making," which 
! implies the use of force] 
The introduction to this document repeats the description of two contradictory 
international trends from the National Security Concept: (1) toward a "unipolar" world 
domi nated by the United States, and (2) toward a "multipolar" world based on rules of 
international law and favored by Russia.
The 1993 military doctrine had distinguished between dangers and threats, with the 
former representing a possibility of war and the latter suggesting an imminent outbreak 
of war. The 28 basic provisions to guarantee military security, both during peace as well 
as war, remain unchanged from the earlier version of the doctrine.
The conditions for use of nuclear weapons are the same as those specified above in the 
national security concept. First use is not ruled out.
In effect, those who prepared the latest version of the military doctrine refused to admit 
that Russia is no longer a superpower, nor can they shed the fear of nonexistent foreign 
threats. Only military power can ensure their security and allay a paranoid view of the 
world.
Information Security Doctrine
A third important document emanating from the SC is the Information Security Doctrine,
(20) approved by Putin on 12 September 2000. Henceforth, the 26 pages of legislation 
provide the government with power to decide what is "socially significant" and required 
to "protect society from distorted and inaccurate information." The term "independent 
Russian press" does not appear in the text.
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Divided into ten sections, the new doctrine states that "freedom of information is 
guaranteed and censorship prohibited." One threat to Russia's information security is 
the allegedly increasing dependence of public life on "foreign information structures." 
Who will decide what is significant and accurate? Obviously, the "properly qualified 
agencies" of government.(21)
Apart from instituting a tight system of control over the mass media, the new information 
security concept establishes censorship, which can result in blocking independent 
sources of information. The government's communications intelligence agency (FAPSI) 
will prevent the spread of disinformation throughout the seven super-administrative 
districts established by Putin's decree of 13 May 2000. All of these presidential 
representatives are ex officio members of the Security Council.
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